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I. Review  of  Historical Developments 
The reform of China’s banking sector was carried out against the background of the country’s 
transition from a planned economy to a market economy. Prior to the reform and the opening up of 
China to the rest of the world, the country’s banking system consisted of only one financial institution, 
the People’s Bank of China (PBC). It was not until 1984, when the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC) was separated out from the PBC, that China became a dual banking system with the 
PBC acting as the central bank and ICBC, China Construction Bank (CCB), Bank of China (BOC) and 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) as the specialized banks. At that time even though these specialized 
banks were given some discretion over business operations, within the framework of the planned 
economy they had limited power in extending credits. 
In 1993, the overall reform direction toward a socialist market economy was established. The 
specialized commercial banks were required to transform into real commercial banks. At the same 
time three policy banks (State Development Bank, Import and Export Bank of China, and Agricultural 
Development Bank of China) were set up in order to separate policy financing and commercial 
financing. In 1995, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks was enacted, 
establishing the specialized banks as state-owned commercial banks and stipulating that the business 
operations of these banks were to be governed by the principles of efficiency, safety and liquidity, and 
that they were to make their own decisions regarding business operations, take responsibility for their 
own risks, assume sole responsibility for their profits and losses, and exercise self-restriction. At the 
early stage of reform, however, the whole economy was in transition and government intervention 
continued to constrain the commercial banks’ discretion with regard to business operations. 
Although China did not suffer as much as its neighbors from the Asian financial crisis in 1997, in the 
years that followed the government began to place great emphasis on financial stability and took 
measures to effectively dissolve financial risks and put the financial sector in order. These measures 
included strengthening financial oversight and performance, reviewing key financial enterprises, 
issuing 270 billion yuan
1 of special bonds to increase the state banks’ capital, setting up asset 
management companies to dispose of non-performing loans (NPLs), closing a number of insolvent or 
poorly functioning financial institutions, and strengthening financial supervision in terms of prudential 
accounting, a loan classification system and disclosure requirements. In order to mitigate financial 
risks, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CIRC) were set up, taking over the supervisory responsibilities for the securities and 
insurance sectors but leaving the supervision of the banking sector with the PBC. 
The Third Plenary Session of the 16th Meeting of the CPC Central Committee decided to turn China’s 
commercial banks into safe and profitable modern financial enterprises with adequate capital, sound 
internal control and good services. This clarified the requirements for and the direction of the reform of 
state-owned banks. The Party Central Committee and State Council decided to start share-holding 
reforms with BOC and CCB on a trial basis by injecting USD 45 billion of capital into the two banks on 
December 30, 2003. In 2005, the reform was extended to ICBC with USD 15 billion being injected. A 
full-fledged reform program, including financial restructuring and improved corporate governance, was 
launched at these banks after recapitalization. Another significant reform implemented in 2003 was the 
creation of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) to take over responsibility for 
supervising banks, asset management companies, trust and investment companies, and other 
depository institutions. At that time, the supervisory framework of parallel supervision for separate 
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financial industries was established with the release of the Banking Supervision Law, the revised Law 
of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China and the revised Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on Commercial Banks. 
Significant progress has been made in building a sound banking system over the years of reform and 
opening. By the end of 2004, there were four state-owned commercial banks, three policy banks, 
12  share-holding commercial banks, 112 city commercial banks, 681 urban credit cooperatives 
(UCCs), 32,854 rural credit cooperatives (RCCs), eight rural cooperative banks, seven rural 
commercial banks, 211 foreign financial institutions, 220 foreign bank representative offices, four asset 
management companies, 59 trust and investment companies, 74 finance companies, 12 financial 
leasing companies, three auto financing companies and a large number of post office savings 
institutions all over the country. The total amount of financial assets of both Chinese and foreign 
financial institutions amounted to 31.02 trillion yuan. China’s banking system remains sound, with total 
assets, deposits and loans growing steadily, profitability improving and risk control ability 
strengthened. The banking sector continues to play an important role in resource allocation, 
channeling savings to investments. 
II.  The Reform of the Banking Sector  
1.  Toward commercialization: the share-holding reform of the state commercial banks  
After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the Chinese government made strategic plans to push forward 
comprehensive reform of the state-owned commercial banks. The measures taken included issuing 
special bonds to increase the state banks’ capital, disposing of NPLs, and promulgating prudential 
accounting principles and a loan classification system. The state banks also actively engaged in 
operational mechanism reform, and in improving lending procedures and risk control. The reforms 
helped the banks to increase capital adequacy ratios, strengthen internal controls and raise 
profitability.  
In September 2003, the State Council decided to start the share-holding reform of the state 
commercial banks through financial restructuring, internal management reform, operational 
mechanism transformation and strict supervision, turning the banks into competitive, profitable and 
modern commercial banks with sound corporate governance, strict internal control, and adequate 
capital. The reform followed the principle of setting up clear ownership structures, clarifying rights and 
obligations, avoiding government intervention in enterprise operation, and applying scientific  
The pilot share-holding reform of the state commercial banks was carried out based on both the 
lessons learned from domestic economic and financial reform and international experiences. The 
reform proceeded in phases, i.e. financial restructuring, disposing of NPLs, setting up the share-
holding company and listing on the stock market. The “one bank one policy” rule was applied. On 
December 16, 2003, with the approval of the State Council, Central Huijin Investment Co., Ltd. (CHIC) 
was established. CHIC acts as the state’s representative in state bank financial restructuring and in 
providing financing, resolving the long-lasting problem of lack of a concrete representative for state 
ownership. Related reform policies regarding taxation, wages, social security, state land 
administration, personnel, business registration, and financial supervision were also put into place. 
Thanks to the scientific design of the reform plan, clear objectives for each stage, and the active 
cooperation of related government agencies, the reforms have achieved the intended results.  
On December 30, 2003, CHIC injected USD 22.5 billion into BOC and CCB respectively, and later, 
USD 15 billion into ICBC. In disposing of their NPLs, the banks wrote off the bad assets and auctioned 
the NPLs to achieve a higher recovery rate. After financial restructuring and disposal of NPLs, the 
capital adequacy ratios of BOC and CCB reached 8.26% and 11.95%; their NPL ratios declined to 
5.12% and 3.70%; profit before provisioning reached 58.5 billion yuan and 60.8 billion yuan 
respectively; and loan provisioning stood at 78.3 billion yuan and 58.3 billion yuan respectively. The 
ability of these banks to mitigate risks has thus been improved significantly. 
In establishing share-holding companies, BOC and CCB also underwent institutional restructuring and 
put into place corporate governance and internal control guidelines. BOC established its share-holding 
company on August 26, 2004 and CCB on September 21, 2004. The share-holders’ meetings, boards, BIS Papers No 28  183
 
supervisory boards and new management teams of the two banks are now in operation. The boards 
and supervisory boards have taken on the responsibility of reviewing important issues and the 
management teams have made maximizing share-holder value the operating objective. The two banks 
are working to improve internal control, risk management, institutional streamlining, operational 
procedures and personnel management. 
At the same time, they are actively seeking cooperation with foreign strategic investors and have 
entered into cooperation agreements with Bank of America, Temasek, Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS, 
and ADB. 
ICBC’s capital adequacy ratio, asset quality, risk provisioning and profitability have witnessed drastic 
improvements after capital injection and NPL disposal. In taking on the rights and responsibilities of 
the state share-holder, the Ministry of Finance and CHIC have begun to play a concrete role in 
corporate governance reform. ICBC became a share-holding company in October 2005.  
Positive results have also been seen in ABC’s endeavor to improve operation, deepen internal reform, 
and strengthen risk control, laying a solid foundation for share-holding reform in the future.  
2.  Strengthening of the local banks: RCCs, UCCs and city commercial banks 
RCCs were among the early financial institutions established after the People’s Republic of China 
came into being. Before 1996, ABC oversaw the operation of RCCs. In 1996, the PBC took over this 
responsibility and invested a lot of resources in revitalizing and supervising these institutions. At the 
beginning of 2003, the supervision of RCCs was taken over by the CBRC. According to the Plan for 
Deepening RCC Reform on a Trial Basis, released by the State Council on June 27, 2003, reform 
trials were launched in Jilin, Shandong, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shanxi, Guizhou and Chongqing. 
The reform followed the principles of clarifying ownership, strengthening discipline, and enhancing 
service functions. While the local government took the lead and full responsibility for the reforms, the 
central government provided valuable support in terms of fiscal transfers, taxation policy and funding 
in the pilot projects. So far, the reform has yielded noticeable results. The resilience and funding of 
these institutions has strengthened as their capital adequacy ratio and financial performance have 
improved significantly, and historical burdens have been partially shed. Reforms in ownership, 
organization, operational system and especially internal control were also carried out. By August 2004 
the reform had been extended to 21 municipalities and provinces including Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei. 
At present, the reform is proceeding smoothly as the performance and services of the RCCs continue 
to improve.  
In 1998 the supervisory authorities started the reform of the UCCs. Reforms included changing the 
UCCs in the rural counties into RCCs, consolidating and restructuring some UCCs into single legal-
person institutions, allowing commercial banks to acquire UCCs, transforming some UCCs into city 
commercial banks and closing those with high risks. After six years of consolidation and rectification, 
the number of UCCs had decreased from 3,290 in 1998 to 681 in 2004.  
The city commercial banks have a number of comparative advantages, such as having many outlets, 
and enjoy a high degree of flexibility in their operations. These banks are taking comprehensive 
measures to improve competitiveness, such as improving corporate governance, introducing foreign 
strategic investors, enhancing disclosure, and strengthening internal control. In order to reduce the 
risks facing the city commercial banks, the municipal governments have replaced their NPLs with 
good-quality assets. As a result, most city commercial banks have raised capital adequacy ratios and 
liquidity ratios to the levels required by the supervisory authorities. 
3.  Continued expansion by foreign banks 
The business scope and geographical coverage of foreign banks continue to expand. In order to allow 
them to further expand their scope and to give domestic enterprises greater access to financing, the 
banks were allowed to do RMB business in 13 cities in 2003, and this number was increased to 18 in 
2004. The foreign banks were also allowed to provide RMB services to Chinese enterprises in the 
above regions.  
Cooperation between foreign and domestic banks has witnessed great progress in areas such as 
financing, settlements, commercial paper discounting, government bond investment, derivatives, 
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have also invested in Chinese commercial banks, bringing encouraging changes in board operation, 
risk management, market development and business operations to the latter and gaining market share 
and customers for themselves. 
III.  Risks Facing the Banking Sector 
At this stage, Chinese banks face credit risk, market risk, operational risk and liquidity risk and are 
vigilant in improving their risk control capacity.  
1. Credit  risk 
Credit risk arising from NPLs and loan concentration is the major risk to the banking sector. There are 
several problems that require further action. First, the share of indirect (bank) financing is too high and 
concentrates credit risks in the banking sector. Measures have been taken to increase direct financing 
by developing the equity and bond markets. Second, the financing relations between the banks and 
enterprises need to be further improved. As the major bank customers, if enterprises could improve 
profitability, debt repayment capacity, asset quality and credibility and reduce defaults after reforms, 
they could help the banks to lower their NPL ratios. Third, the accounting system and taxation policy 
need to be improved to reflect the fact that the banks need to take enough provisioning to write off 
NPLs in order to mitigate risks. Fourth, markets where NPLs can be disposed of and risk products can 
be traded have yet to be established. These markets are essential for banks to identify, price and 
transfer risks, and to dispose of NPLs accumulated in the past. Fifth, the intermediaries, such as 
accounting firms, law firms, assessment agencies, rating agencies and credit reporting agencies, have 
yet to play the role they should have in providing professional services. More efforts should be made in 
fostering the development of these intermediaries. 
2. Market  risk 
As China is undergoing interest rate reform, the risks faced by the banking system require special 
attention. Significant progress has been made in interest rate reform since 2004. The lending rate 
ceiling and deposit rate floor have been removed and the bands for floating rates widened. However, 
reform is still in progress here. If the banks cannot charge different lending rates to enterprises with 
different risk profiles, they may not be able to cover losses, nor can they appropriately price their 
fee-based services and deposit products. On the other hand, as the banks rely mainly on the interest 
spread for income, interest rate fluctuations may impact their profitability. They have to put in more 
effort to develop fee-based businesses and raise the related income share to mitigate the impact of 
price fluctuations in the market. At the same time, they should pay more attention to macroeconomic 
research in order to adjust business strategies accordingly to avoid losses.  
3. Operational  risk 
Since many layers of agent and owner relationship exist between bank creditors and share-holders, 
share-holders and management, as well as between different levels of management, operational risk 
may easily arise due to malfunctioning of corporate governance and inadequate internal control 
mechanisms. In recent years, there have been some reforms in internal control mechanisms in the 
banking sector, for example in risk control, financial management, wage incentives, business 
procedures and information technology. Efforts have also been made to improve corporate 
governance. Nevertheless, great challenges remain in the areas of corporate overnance, operational 
mechanism transformation and internal control. 
4. Liquidity  risk 
The mismatch of RMB deposit and lending maturities has been an outstanding weakness. By the end 
of 2004, the ratio of mid- and long-term lending to mid-/long-term deposits had risen to 135.4%, 
35.4 percentage points higher than the required ratio, reflecting the fact that large amounts of short-BIS Papers No 28  185
 
term deposits are used for mid- and long-term lending. In addition, over half of the working capital 
lending is put to uses other than the intended use. Thus potential liquidity risks deserve due attention. 
5.  Risk of a sharp turnaround in the economy 
In fact, the greatest concern in banking operations is sharp ups and downs in the economy. In a boom, 
the banking sector usually performs well, with high profits and improved asset quality. Recent years 
have seen the reduction of NPLs at an annual rate of 3-5 percentage points due to the economic 
upturn. However, in the event of a recession, NPLs might mushroom. This can be proved by the 
drastic change in NPLs in Thailand, Korea and Singapore before and after the Asian financial crisis. 
When a financial crisis happens, the economy slows down and as a result, the NPL ratio usually rises 
substantially. 
Economic cycles are inevitable in a market economy, especially during the transition period. To deal 
with this, commercial banks should set up high-quality research teams with the ability to make 
economic forecasts and reach timely judgments on possible fluctuations, so as to maintain good 
performance during economic upturns, and to carry out preventive measures in downturns to mitigate 
any adverse impact. In order to effectively keep the commercial banks from creating a large amount of 
NPLs after the recent reform, the Chinese government should make efforts to control the economic 
cycles, to prevent the economy from undergoing sharp changes. From the macro-adjustment 
viewpoint, besides adopting appropriate monetary policy instruments at the right time to prevent sharp 
swings, asset bubbles deserve special attention and should be avoided if possible. Once bubbles are 
formed, it is not easy to make adjustments and more efforts will be needed. One example of this is 
Japan’s case. In the case of China, most concerns have been focused on the stock market and real 
estate market. Nevertheless, asset bubbles might take different forms in China, such as appearing in 
the manufacturing sector, other processing industries or raw material industries, in the form of excess 
capacity. If such a situation emerges, it would reflect the imbalance of investment and consumption in 
relation to GDP. Therefore, macroeconomic management and aggregate analysis could not only help 
the commercial banks in identifying potential risks, but also help to reduce sharp fluctuations in the 
economy, thus helping banks to avoid accumulating a large amount of NPLs. 
6.  Measures to improve banks’ risk prevention capacity 
International experience suggests that capital adequacy ratios and risk management capacity are the 
essential risk prevention factors for banks. In this vein, China’s banking industry needs to make further 
efforts. On the one hand, the capital adequacy ratio of some Chinese banks is relatively low, lower 
than the 8% ratio set by the Basel Capital Accord. Loan provision gaps still exist, and some banks do 
not have enough provisions to keep up with the rapid increase in lending. International experience 
also shows that the capital adequacy requirement can not only restrain banks from expanding credit 
business needlessly, but also encourage them to diversify operational risks by exploring new business 
areas which do not have a high capital adequacy requirement. China’s commercial banks should 
follow a scientific approach for development, raise their capital adequacy ratios and strengthen their 
risk prevention capability, through both internal measures, such as improving asset quality and 
maximizing profit, and external channels like inviting strategic investors and listing on the stock 
market. On the other hand, they urgently need to set up risk pricing mechanisms and risk control 
models. With the majority of their income from interest spread, if commercial banks could fully utilize 
the interest leverage and accurately price the risks of customers, their net spread could enlarge, and 
therefore profitability could also be strengthened. Accurate identification, measuring, pricing and 
control of risks are essential for risk mitigation, and also provide the core strength for banks to 
compete in the market economy. International experiences suggest financial institutions need to invest 
large amounts of resources to strengthen risk pricing capability, establish sound risk management 
policy and procedures, and collect adequate data. The risk control mechanisms need to be tested in 
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IV.  The Evolution of China’s Financial Stability Policies 
1. Banking  supervision 
In the past decade, significant progress has been made in strengthening banking supervision, along 
with the establishment of a supervisory legal framework and the deepening of banking reform. Since 
2002, in convergence with the international trend, China’s banking supervision has shifted from 
emphasizing regulatory compliance only to emphasizing both regulatory compliance and risk 
supervision. Since the establishment of the CBRC in 2003, supervision has become better targeted 
and the new supervisory concept of “supervision of legal person, risks, and internal control and greater 
transparency” has been formed; new standards have also been put into place. A five-category 
classification of loans, the CAMEL rating system and other prudential regulations have been 
introduced. Corporate governance and internal control mechanisms have become the focus of 
supervision. Offsite surveillance and onsite supervision complement each other in ongoing prudential 
supervision. A risk assessment system and an early warning mechanism have also been set up. While 
improving prudential supervision of financial institutions, the supervisory agencies have also begun to 
pay attention to balancing the need to maintain financial stability with the need to encourage financial 
innovation. 
International practice suggests that despite the role they play in financial supervision, central banks 
usually set up different forms of regulatory coordination mechanism with ministries of finance and 
other supervisory institutions, to share the responsibilities for maintaining financial stability. In China, it 
is recognized that a coordinated framework including the central bank, the Ministry of Finance, and 
bank, securities and insurance supervisors, will help to improve financial regulation and maintain 
financial stability. 
2.  Deposit insurance system 
Many countries set up investor protection systems such as deposit insurance schemes, a securities 
investor protection fund and an insurance policy-holder protection fund, to protect the interests of 
investors and enhance their confidence in the financial system. Different countries may have different 
schemes. Currently, China has a securities investor protection fund and an insurance policy-holder 
protection fund. Now the conditions for setting up a deposit insurance system have also been put into 
place. 
Since 1997, many deposit institutions have been closed and liquidated. The liquidated assets of these 
institutions could not repay all the liabilities to individuals. In order to ensure social stability, the 
government utilized government funds (including local governments’ specialized borrowings from the 
central government) and central bank re-lending in filling in the gap. While this implicit deposit 
insurance increases the burden of the authorities, it is not conducive to raising the risk awareness of 
investors, and weakens market discipline on the operation of financial institutions. 
The establishment of an explicit insurance system, and utilization of the premium paid by deposit 
institutions to save the problem institutions, could relieve the government’s burdens. Meanwhile, 
elimination of the implicit government subsidy and establishment of a market-based limited 
compensation system would strengthen the risk awareness of market participants, who could then 
make investment decisions based on the risk information of different institutions and allow market 
discipline to play its role. In addition, imposing different levels of premium based on the risk profiles of 
the deposit institutions could also help to form the positive incentive mechanism. 
China has been well prepared for establishing such a system. First, the gradual deepening of banking 
reform has set a good micro-foundation. So far, the share-holding reform of the state-owned 
commercial banks has been bearing fruit; the pilot program of deepening RCC reform has expanded 
to 29 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions; and reforms to other financial institutions, like 
share-holding commercial banks, city commercial banks, UCCs, and trust and investment companies, 
have also been proceeding smoothly. Both the asset quality and the capital adequacy ratio of China’s 
banks have improved with sounder operations. Second, with progress made in financial supervision, 
supervisory measures have been strengthened and standardized. Third, the gradual improvement of 
the financial legislation has formed a good external environment which consists of the Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China, the Law of the People’s Republic of China 
on Commercial Banks, the Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Accounting Law of BIS Papers No 28  187
 
the People’s Republic of China, the Guarantee Law of China and the Company Law of the People’s 
Republic of China. Fourth, the accounting standard of China’s banks has been improved to be in line 
with the international standard. To be listed in international capital markets, commercial banks need to 
adopt international accounting and supervision standards which will facilitate the gradual adoption of 
prudential accounting standards. Fifth, since many countries have already set up their own deposit 
insurance systems, China can benefit from their experience and avoid their mistakes. Sixth, the 
sustained, rapid and healthy growth of the Chinese economy in recent years with sound financial 
operations provides a beneficial macro-environment for the establishment of a deposit insurance 
system. Currently, the PBC, together with other relevant agencies, is actively working on designing a 
deposit insurance system that will allow positive incentives and market discipline to come fully into 
play. 
3.  Lender of last resort 
Generally speaking, central banks should only provide liquidity support to financially sound financial 
institutions which run into liquidity problems that may have systemic impacts, while the fiscal 
authorities deal with those that have become insolvent and unsustainable and might incur systemic 
risks. In performing the role of lender of last resort, China’s central bank focuses on the following 
issues: 
(a)  Systemic risk prevention. Systemic risk may result in financial instability and hinder 
economic growth; therefore, it requires the central bank to perform the role of lender of last 
resort during times of financial crisis. 
(b)  Moral hazard prevention. The central bank usually performs the role of lender of last resort if 
the failure of a financial institutions could have systemic effects. For institutions that are in 
financial difficulties but have no systemic implications, the central bank steps back and lets 
market mechanisms such as bankruptcy and liquidation play their role. Thus the investors 
and senior management have to share the cost of and responsibility for their own decisions. 
The working of market discipline can help to prevent moral hazard. 
(c) Investor  protection  system. This system is an important guarantee for a central bank to 
perform its lender of last resort role. In China’s case, a comprehensive investor risk 
compensation system is not in place. Neither are employment or medical insurance widely 
available. Therefore, the PBC has to consider whether the closure of financial institutions will 
result in social instability, in addition to the possible systemic risks. To some extent, the PBC 
performs a public finance role. To maintain financial stability, an investor protection 
mechanism will have to be set up, and its relationship with the central bank’s lender of last 
resort role should be well balanced. 
(d)  Coordination of monetary policy to prevent inflation. While acting as the lender of last resort, 
the central bank should make an effort to conduct sound monetary policy. 
Moral hazard should be effectively prevented. In theory, this can be achieved by raising the lending 
rate, acting as the lender of last resort in a way that preserves constructive ambiguity, encouraging 
private capital in restructuring financial institutions and strengthening market discipline. In practice, to 
prevent and diversify risks and maintain financial stability, having the central bank play the role of 
lender of last resort is not enough; good corporate governance and internal controls, prudential 
supervision, an investor protection system, and a market-based exit mechanism should also be put 
into place. 